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Summary: The product of discrete sources and strands, the protection 
of fundamental rights in Europe has now begun to knit together. The 
diffi culties spring less from widely varying views of what fundamental 
rights ought to be than from their being played out upon different planes 
and to different purpose: pan-Europe by virtue of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, and pan-European Union with its economic 
(Community) emphasis and partially common law approach combined 
now with a codifi ed Charter of Fundamental Rights. Perhaps more 
contentious is the institutional mechanisms by which rights are to be 
judicially protected, the relatively coherent Convention system and the 
quasi-appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights through the 
right of individual petition, and the Community/Union system which 
exists in a different dimension yet embraces (or purports to embrace), 
but is not (yet) formally married to, the Convention - but to which, it is 
important to remember, the member states are signatory and still sub-
ject. The two courts at the heart of this protection, the Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg and the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, have 
moved slowly into a closer embrace, but each remains subject still to 
the peculiarities of its jurisdiction, conscious of the practical limits to its 
authority and wary of the risks of over-confi dence and extending itself 
too far. Recent developments in their case law, brought about especial-
ly by the growth of Union activities which escape Luxembourg scrutiny, 
have brought issues to a head and produced both robustness and def-
erence from Strasbourg. At the same time events are moving on as life 
is breathed back into the Constitution for Europe, which had proposed 
one solution, by the draft Reform Treaty, which proposes another. It 
also goes down the road of yet more variable geometry, a device all too 
easy as a means of earning agreement in the political arena but often 
leaving legal chaos in its wake.
There has been a long, slow, and sometimes reluctant develop-
ment of fundamental rights protection within the European Community 
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and, subsequently, the Union. Whilst by any standard a great deal has 
been achieved, it is still a work in progress. Recent judgments of both 
the Court of Justice (‘Luxembourg’) and the European Court of Human 
Rights (‘Strasbourg’) have now conspired to make the issues more com-
plex still, giving heart to those who feared that we enjoyed inadequate 
levels of protection within the Union, yet at the same time not providing 
them unalloyed comfort.
What we are now witnessing is the development of multi-level or 
triangular protection - by Strasbourg, by Luxembourg and by national 
courts - for the implementation and protection of fundamental rights in 
the Union. It is what a recent President of the Court of Human Rights 
called ‘détriplement fonctionnel’,1 and it defi es both easy defi nition and 
easy coordination. And it is a matter not just of overlapping jurisdiction 
but of overlapping and cross-fertilised substantive law, yet applied by the 
various courts in a manner which refl ects their purpose and their legal 
culture.
There are a great many issues which come under the umbrella of 
the topic. The areas to be considered here are, fi rst, the developments 
relating to the surviving obligations of the member states, as signatories 
of and parties to the European Convention, in the Community/Union 
context and the continuing application of the Convention and jurisdiction 
of the Court of Human Rights in the face of competing Union norms; and 
second, interwoven with the fi rst, whether the Community and/or Union, 
although not party to it, have absorbed, or assumed, obligations under 
the Convention and, if so, how they might be enforced. Events recent and 
in train have added new variables to the equation which make jurisdic-
tion détriplement now an oversimplifi cation.
1. Treaty norms
There is a preliminary issue, sometimes overlooked, to be consid-
ered, which is the hierarchy of treaties in the Community/Union system, 
a function partly of public international law, partly of the Community 
treaties themselves. The Community, and subsequently the Union, were 
created by international treaties. Other than the breadth of the Commu-
nity undertaking there was little in the (then) EEC Treaty to indicate a 
fundamental qualitative difference between it and most other internation-
al treaties - although those with eyes to see could perhaps have detected 
its many hints to that effect. It was not until van Gend en Loos2 that the 
1  L Wildhaber, ‘The Coordination of the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe’, an 
address presented in Geneva, 8 September 2005.
2  Case 26/62 Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Neder-
landse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1.
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revolutionary nature of that Treaty, and the ‘new legal order’ it creates, 
began to become apparent. So the Court may now observe glibly that the 
Treaty is less a treaty, more a (quasi-)constitution: ‘albeit concluded in 
the form of an international agreement, [it] none the less constitutes the 
constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law’.3 And 
whilst van Gend en Loos confi rms the transfer of sovereignty to the Com-
munity (‘for the benefi t of which the states have limited their sovereign 
rights’),4 of course what the Community - still less the Union - is not is a 
federal or similar (and certainly not a legislative) union which would have 
assumed and extinguished the international personality of the member 
states.5 They remain subjects of international law and in principle bound 
by the treaty obligations into which they entered, unless those obliga-
tions are displaced in some manner consistent with international law.
For clarity, the Treaty provides that rights and obligations deriving 
from treaties between one or more member states on the one hand and 
one or more third countries on the other which existed prior to the entry 
into force of the Treaty (or, for accession member states, prior to the date 
of their accession) ‘shall not be affected’ by the Treaty.6 This is simply ar-
ticulation of a principle recognised in international law,7 and in law gen-
erally, that a contractual obligation cannot be avoided by a party entering 
subsequently into a different obligation with an unconnected party which 
is inconsistent with the fi rst:
[T]he purpose of that provision is to make it clear, in accordance 
with the principles of international law, that application of the EC 
Treaty does not affect the duty of the Member State concerned to 
3  Opinion 1/91 Re the EEA Agreement [1991] ECR I-6079 para 21. In 1986 the Court had 
referred to judicial review of Community legislation for ‘conformity with the basic constitu-
tional charter, the Treaty’; Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament 
[1986] ECR 1339 para 23. The Bundesverfassungsgericht attributed this quality to the 
Treaty as early as 1967 (‘Der EWG-Vertrag stellt gewissermaßen die Verfassung dieser Ge-
meinschaft dar’); 18. Oktober 1967, BVerfGE 22, 293, 296.
4  Case 26/62 van Gend en Loos (n 2) 12.
5  This is not to touch upon the fraught subject of the international personality of the 
regional authorities of a federation, in particular the extent to which they may enter into 
treaties, a principle which, provided that the capacity is admitted in the federal constitu-
tion, has gained some recognition in international law; see Report of the International Law 
Commission to the General Assembly [1966] ILC Yearbook vol II 169, 191-192. See also 
draft Article 5(2) to what became the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (n 
7): ‘Members of a federal union may possess capacity to conclude treaties if such capacity 
is admitted by the federal constitution and within the limits there laid down’, which was 
ultimately repressed.
6  Art 307(1) EC Treaty.
7  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 
27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 art 30; Harvard Law School, Research in International 
Law, III. Law of Treaties, Supplement to (1935) 29 AJIL 707, 1024.
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respect the rights of third countries under a prior agreement and to 
perform its obligations thereunder.8
The Treaty does however impose upon the member states an obli-
gation to ‘take all appropriate steps’ to do away with any irregularities 
to which they give rise (‘eliminate the incompatibilities established’).9 Pre-
sumably this extends to an obligation to denounce an inconsistent treaty 
obligation where that authority exists10 and, where it does not, to seek to 
negotiate its termination. If necessary the member states are to assist each 
other in this end and, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude.11 Ma-
terial amendment to a pre-existing treaty with a third country is deemed to 
be a new treaty, not enjoying the protection of article 307.12
Article 307 applies to bilateral or multilateral treaties with third 
countries but if multilateral and involving two or more member states 
it does not, as a general principle, apply as between or amongst them.13 
The co-existence of the two apparently contradictory propositions was 
described elegantly by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice thus:
Since anything that some of the parties to a treaty do inter se under 
another treaty is clearly res inter alios acta, it cannot in law result 
in any formal diminution of the obligation of these parties under the 
earlier treaty, or affect juridically the rights or position of other par-
ties, which remain legally intact and subsisting,14
and less elegantly by the Court of Justice:
By virtue of the principles of international law, by assuming a new 
obligation which is incompatible with rights held under a prior treaty 
a state ipso facto gives up the exercise of these rights to the extent 
necessary for the performance of its new obligations. [...] In mat-
ters governed by the EEC Treaty, that Treaty takes precedence over 
8  Case T-306/01 Yusuf v Council & Commission [2005] ECR II-3533 para 236. The Court 
recognised this principle to operate from the other side of the fence, saying it would breach 
art 10 of the Treaty (as well as public international law) were a member state now to enter 
into an international commitment with a third country which would affect or alter the scope 
of Community rules; Case C-523/04 Commission v Netherlands (Open Skies) (ECJ 24 April 
2007).
9  Art 307(2) EC Treaty.
10  See Case C-84/98 Commission v Portugal [2000] ECR I-5215; Case C-203/03 Commis-
sion v Austria [2005] ECR I-935.
11  Art 307(2) EC Treaty.
12  Case C-523/04 Open Skies (n 8).
13  Case 10/61 EEC Commission v Italy [1962] ECR 1; Case C-473/93 Commission v Luxem-
bourg [1996] ECR I-3207; Case C-147/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-5969.
14  G Fitzmaurice, Third Report [on the Law of Treaties] [1958] ILC Yearbook vol. II 43.
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agreements concluded between Member States before its entry into 
force.15
In other words, the more recent (Community) obligations displace 
prior obligations of the member states inter se where the interests of third 
countries (or persons in third countries), of which it is the purpose of 
article 307 to protect, are not in issue. According to the Court of Justice, 
this ‘cannot be criticized by third countries since [it] does not interfere 
with the rights held by third counties under agreements still in force’;16 
it squares this construction with the text of article 307 by distinguishing 
between the ‘rights’ to which it refers as the rights of third countries and 
the ‘obligations’ which adhere to the member states.17
Now this is permitted in international law, but not without reserva-
tion; it is not permitted if it is forbidden by the provisions of the earlier 
treaty or if the latter treaty is so inconsistent with the general purpose 
of the earlier treaty as to be likely to frustrate it.18 Nor is it a rule applied 
universally even within Community law. Exempted from it are:
• the United Nations Charter, to which all member states save Ger-
many were contracting parties prior to their Community/Union 
membership;19 the Court of Justice appears to accept the UN’s own 
construct20 that the Charter has priority over Community law even 
as amongst the member states simply as a function of the primacy 
accorded it within the hierarchy of public international law;21
• the treaties founding the Belgium-Luxembourg economic union 
(BLEU)22 and the Benelux economic union,23 which are ring-fenced 
15  Case 10/61 EEC Commission v Italy (n 13) 10.
16  Ibid 11.
17  Ibid 10; Case C-473/93 Commission v Luxembourg (n 13) per opinion of AG Léger para 
163.
18  Harvard Law School (n 7) 1016.
19  The Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic were both admitted to the UN, fol-
lowing long and complex legal and political debate, only in 1973; UNGA Res 3050 (XXVIII) 
(18 September 1973). Membership of the Democratic Republic lapsed with its dissolution 
in 1990.
20  See Charter of the United Nations art 103: ‘In the event of a confl ict between the obligations 
of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under 
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail’.
21  Case T-306/01 Yusuf v Council & Commission [2005] ECR II-3533.
22  Convention établissant une Union économique entre le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg 
et la Belgique (adopted 25 July 1921, entered into force 1 May 1922) 9 LNTS 223; replaced 
in 2005 by Protocole portant modifi cation de la Convention coordonnée instituant l’Union 
économique belgo-luxembourgeoise (adopted 18 December 2002, entered into force 16 Jan-
uary 2005) JO du G-D de Luxembourg du 17 juin 2004, 1515.
23  Traité instituant l’Union économique Benelux (adopted 5 February 1958, entered into 
force 1 November 1960) 381 UNTS 165, replacing the Benelux customs union (Convention 
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from the application of the EC Treaty (it ‘shall not preclude the ex-
istence or completion of [those] regional unions’) insofar as ‘the[ir] 
objectives […] are not attained by the application of this Treaty’.24 
Thus article 306 saves a BLEU and/or Benelux rule inconsistent 
with Community law if it pursues a legitimate objective of the union, 
serves a more advanced degree of integration than the equivalent 
Community rule25 and is necessary for that purpose;26
• the Euratom Treaty, from which the provisions of the EC Treaty 
‘shall not derogate’.27
In the same way the priority of the EC and Euratom Treaties them-
selves, present and future, is preserved over the Treaty on European 
Union,28 so long as the Community/Union constitutional structure sub-
sists.
What was not clear, and has only recently been made clear(er), is the 
place within this scheme in which the European Convention on Human 
Rights, to which all member states were contracting parties prior to their 
Community/Union accession,29 fi nds itself. The public international law 
rule is relatively straightforward where a prior and a later treaty are con-
cerned with the same, or a similar, subject matter. But the Community 
and the Convention exist on different planes; perhaps more accurately, 
douanière néerlando-belgo-luxembourgeoise; adopted 5 September 1944, entered into force 
1 January 1948) 32 UNTS 143.
24  Art 306 EC Treaty. The Open Skies rule that would leave the 1958 modifi cation of Ben-
elux and the 2002 modifi cation of the BLEU unprotected from the full force of the Treaty 
(see n 8) does not apply (presumably) because art 306 ring-fences not the treaties creating 
the BLEU and the Benelux but ‘these regional unions’. In the same way the Benelux Treaty 
(art 94(1)) permits derogation for the BLEU in terms almost identical, and the 1972 acces-
sion Treaty (art 48) permitted similar, if more limited and now spent, derogation from the 
EEC Treaty for obligations arising from the 1965 Free Trade Agreement between Ireland and 
the United Kingdom.
25  Case 105/83 [1984] Pakvries v Minister van Landbouw en Visserij [1984] ECR 2101; 
Case C-473/93 Commission v Luxembourg [1996] ECR I-3207.
26  Case 56/75 Elz v Commission [1976] ECR 1097.
27  Art 305(2) EC Treaty. There is a similar saving provision for the ECSC Treaty in art 
305(1) which is now spent. The latter disappeared in the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe, the former to be saved in the Euratom Treaty itself, as a new art 106a(3); pre-
sumably the Reform Treaty will make similar provision.
28  Art 47 Treaty on European Union (hereinafter TEU) (‘[N]othing in this Treaty shall affect 
the Treaties establishing the European Communities or the subsequent Treaties and Acts 
modifying or supplementing them’).
29  The exception is France, which although a founding member of the Council of Europe 
did not ratify the Convention until 1974; therefore, uniquely, for France the EEC Treaty is 
the prior treaty. This opens up the theoretical (although probably not material) possibility 
that the Convention may apply differently in France owing to any constraints placed upon it 
by Community (that is, EEC) law, but not by any material subsequent (post-1974) changes 
to it.
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the Convention exists on its own 2-dimensional plane, but Community law 
- and certainly Union law taken as a whole - occupy n-dimensional space, 
across which the former may cut at any number of interstices. There are 
further, qualitative differences: whilst the medium of the Convention is by 
necessity a compact between states, it speaks directly to individuals and 
their benefi t, in a context of fundamental human rights, as against the 
state; the original EEC Treaty is an economic blueprint, any tangency with 
human rights not immediately apparent. Put differently, the Convention 
is primarily for the benefi t of the individual properly so-called, and a trawl 
through the case law of the Court of Human Rights will confi rm that it is 
the individual who most frequently calls upon its aid. As for Community 
law, the concern of directly effective Treaty rights is for the individual in its 
normal (if misleading) Community law sense of both natural and juridical 
person, and Luxembourg’s meat and drink is his interests within the over-
riding imperative of building the common/internal market: van Gend en 
Loos may have been the vanguard in the wake of which all else follows, but 
van Gend en Loos was a naamloos venootschap, not a true individual. And 
the interests, and protection, of the true individual are in many respects 
different from that of a corporation. Added to this is the superior norm 
which human rights conventions may, or in the view of some ought to, 
occupy. The counter argument is a strict application of article 30 of the Vi-
enna Convention, that the member states have displaced the operation of 
the Convention and replaced it with the Community’s own system for the 
protection of human rights, at least where Community law applies. This 
would mean, if positing a Community standard which offers lesser protec-
tion than does the Convention, the higher standard applies to a citizen of 
the Union when exercising rights wholly unconnected with Community 
law; or, even more bizarrely, a Latvian, for example, enjoying greater (Con-
vention) rights within the Community insofar as he is a subject of Com-
munity law prior to 2004, his nationality entitling him to the continuing 
protection of the Convention by article 307 of the Treaty, but that protec-
tion being downgraded immediately upon accession to the Union. 
2. Fundamental Rights in Community/Union Law
That the protection of fundamental rights forms part of Community 
law is no longer seriously in doubt. Whilst there is spirited (and perhaps 
inevitable) debate as to its extent, and serious criticism from some quar-
ters that what the Court of Justice says and what the Court does are, in 
this context, two very different things,30 it is now fully established in a 
30  See in particular J Coppell & A O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights 
Seriously?’ (1992) 29 CML Rev 669. This article engendered a spirited riposte in WHH 
Weiler & N Lockhart, ‘“Taking Rights Seriously” Seriously: The European Court and its 
Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence’ (1995) 32 CML Rev 51 and 579.
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consistent line of case law that respect for fundamental (human) rights 
forms a general principle of Community law, and, in the pantheon of the 
general principles of Community law, it is primus inter pares.
But it is equally well known that it was not always so. The original 
Treaty made no mention of fundamental human rights and the Court of 
Justice originally repelled any argument that Community action ought to 
be made subject to them31 - a view sometimes attributed now to the ‘sins 
of youth’. From the early 1970s, and it is thought at least partially in re-
sponse to fear of rebellion from the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
the Court of Justice has held consistently that ‘respect for fundamen-
tal human rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law 
protected by the Court of Justice’.32 As a result we are now at a stage in 
which the Treaty on European Union can say: ‘The Union is founded on 
the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common 
to the Member States’.33 As they are not (yet) in the Treaty, the question 
then arises as to where these human rights and fundamental freedoms 
come from.
At the moment the Court recognises three distinct but intertwined 
sources of fundamental rights law,34 as follows:
a) The constitutional traditions common to the member states
This was the fi rst source of fundamental rights to be recognised by 
the Court of Justice. But as an operational body of law they are very dif-
fi cult to identify. The traditions run the spectrum from paragraphs 1 to 
20 of the German Basic Law, a stringent catalogue of rights which forms 
the highest constitutional norm in the Federal Republic, to the rights 
of the subject which are recognised by the common law of England but 
which are written nowhere, are not (and cannot be) constitutionally en-
trenched,35 and survive only at the whim of a government and Parliament 
31  Case 1/58 Stork v High Authority [1959] ECR 17; Cases 36 etc/59 Präsident Ruhrkohlen-
Verkaufsgesellschaft v High Authority [1960] ECR 423.
32  Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Ge-
treide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125 para 4.
33  Art 6(1) TEU.
34  For a discussion of this complex approach to sources of human rights, see V Skouris, 
‘Introducing a Binding Bill of Rights for the European Union: Can Three Parallel Systems 
of Protection of Human Rights Co-exist Harmoniously?’ (December 2004) Hellenic Review 
of European Law 3.
35  A laudable attempt was made with the Human Rights Act 1998 which incorporates the 
European Convention into UK law. However it does not entrench the Convention, rather it 
obliges public authorities to act in a manner consistent with it (s 6), requires the courts to 
interpret national law ‘so far as it is possible to do so’ in a manner compatible with Con-
vention rights (s 3), and, if that is not possible, to make a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ (s 
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of the day; and everything in between. From these the Court claims to 
look to, and distil, a high standard of protection rather than the lowest 
common denominator, but it is a complex undertaking and allows the 
Court signifi cant discretion.
b) International treaties
This is much clearer. For the fi rst time in 1974 - shortly after France 
(the last then member state to do so) ratifi ed the Convention and recog-
nised the right of individual petition to the European Court of Human 
Rights - the Court fi rst took notice of international treaties for the protec-
tion of human rights on which the member states have collaborated or of 
which they are signatories as a source of fundamental rights recognised 
by Community law36 - the most important being, of course, the European 
Convention, to which all member states but France had been party prior 
to ratifi cation of the Community/Union Treaties. The Convention is now 
formally recognised (and codifi ed) as such in article 6(2) of the Treaty on 
European Union, which draws it unilaterally into the Union legal sys-
tem:
The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms [...] and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of 
Community law.
The standard formula adopted by the Court became:
[I]t is settled case law that fundamental rights form an integral part 
of the general principles of Community law whose observance is en-
sured by the Community judicature. For that purpose, the Court of 
Justice and the Court of First Instance draw inspiration from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from 
the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of 
human rights on which the Member States have collaborated and to 
which they are signatories. The Convention has special signifi cance 
in this respect.37
4(2)) which does not however alter the validity or effect of the law (s 4(6)). To do more would 
require Parliament to disable its own omnicompetence, which in British constitutional law 
it cannot do. For a (high profi le) example of a declaration of incompatibility see A v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 AC 221.
36  Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491.
37  Case T-112/98 Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission [2001] ECR II-729 para 60. 
For essentially identical constructions, see Opinion 2/94 Re Accession to the ECHR [1996] 
ECR I-1759 para 33; Case C-299/95 Kremzow v Austria [1997] ECR I-2629 para 14; Case 
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And it is a principle which extends beyond Community law to apply 
also to the conduct of the Union:
[I]n accordance with Article 6(2) EU, the Union must respect funda-
mental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. […]
The Framework Decision must thus be interpreted in such a way 
that fundamental rights, including in particular the right to a fair trial as 
set out in Article 6 of the Convention and interpreted by the European 
Court of Human Rights, are respected.38
However, the Court was long careful to ‘draw inspiration’ from the 
Convention, and not apply it directly. Hence, it would say, for example:
Article 6(1) of the EHRC [sic] provides that in the determination of 
his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
The general principle of Community law that everyone is entitled to 
a fair legal process, which is inspired by those fundamental rights 
[...].39
Alternatively,
Respect for that presumption [of innocence] is required of the Com-
mission […] by virtue of the fact that it is a fundamental right guar-
anteed by the ECHR and therefore a general principle of Community 
law pursuant to Article 6(2) EU and the settled case-law of the Com-
munity Courts.40
This is because the Community is not party to the Convention, and 
so, notwithstanding reference to respect of fundamental rights ‘as guar-
anteed by the European Convention’ in article 6 of the TEU, it is not ‘as 
such’ part of Community (or Union) law;41 and under the present Treaty 
it has no constitutional power to accede to it.42 However the Court edged 
gradually ever closer to an embrace with the Convention - for example, 
Advocate-General Jacobs in 1996:
C-7/98 Krombach v Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935 para 25; Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères 
v Directeur Général de la Concurrence [2002] ECR I-9011 para 23.
38  Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285 paras 58-59.
39  Case C-185/95P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417 paras 20-21.
40  Cases T-22 & 23/02 Sumitomo Chemical Co v Commission [2005] ECR II-4065 para 69.
41  Case T-112/98 Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission [2001] ECR II-729 para 59.
42  Opinion 2/94 Re Accession to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759.
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Although the Community itself is not a party to the Convention […] 
and although the Convention may not be formally binding upon the 
Community, nevertheless for practical purposes the Convention can 
be regarded as part of Community law and can be invoked as such 
both in this court and in national courts.43
And in 2004 the Court, for the fi rst time, applied the Convention 
directly: citing case law of the Court of Human Rights which found the re-
fusal of English law to recognise gender reassignment to breach a trans-
sexual’s right to marry under article 12 of the Convention,44 it found it 
also to infringe a Community right to a spouse’s pension rights, and so 
said:
Article 141 EC, in principle, precludes legislation, such as that at 
issue before the national court, which, in breach of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, prevents [the enjoyment of a Community law right].45
More recently, in a case involving Union (not Community) legislation, 
it said:
[I]n accordance with Article 6(2) EU, the Union must respect funda-
mental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention […].
The Framework Decision must thus be interpreted in such a way 
that fundamental rights, including in particular the right to a fair 
trial as set out in Article 6 of the Convention and interpreted by the 
European Court of Human Rights, are respected.46
And back to the Community sphere:
The obligations [imposed upon lawyers] of information and of coop-
eration with the authorities responsible for combating money laun-
dering, laid down in [a directive], do not infringe the right to a fair 
trial as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 6(2) EU.47
43  Case C-85/94 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret v Minister for Transport, Ireland 
[1996] ECR I-3953, per opinion of AG Jacobs para 53.
44  Goodwin v United Kingdom (App no 28957/95) (2002) 35 EHRR 447; I v United Kingdom 
(App no 25680/94) (2003) 36 EHRR 967.
45  Case C-117/01 K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency [2004] ECR I-541, in the 
dispositif.
46  Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285 paras 58-59.
47  Case C-305/05 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone v Conseil des Minis-
tres (ECJ 26 June 2007), in the dispositif.
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The Court thus seems now to have acquired the taste for direct ap-
plication of the Convention. It may, or may not, be relevant that four of 
the ten judges appointed upon the 2004 accessions had served previous-
ly as judges of the Court of Human Rights.48 Whether formal accession 
to the Convention would lead to signifi cant change in the application of 
these principles in Community law is a matter of spirited debate. But it 
is incontestable that because Community conduct is not directly subject 
to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, and even if 
the Court of Justice ‘pays the greatest heed to the case-law of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights’,49 there will inevitably be fi ssures between 
Strasbourg case law (on the Convention) and Luxembourg case law (on 
Community law inspired by it).50 Even if applying the Convention directly 
as it is now increasingly wont to do, inconsistencies are very likely to 
arise. It is not necessarily the case that Luxembourg will get it wrong, 
that it will in some way be ‘soft’ on Convention rights: the Court of Jus-
tice has allowed and will allow human rights to trump even fundamental 
economic rights of the Treaty provided there is objective justifi cation and 
the hindrance is not disproportionate.51 But this illustrates the cultural 
difference between Luxembourg and Strasbourg: the former will iden-
tify a Treaty imperative and then consider whether derogation is justifi ed 
by application of quite strict exculpatory rules; the latter will identify a 
Convention right and require its protection, subject perhaps to a public 
authority’s margin of appreciation. They come at it from different direc-
tions. Therefore Luxembourg may get it wrong. This is, after all, why the 
Treaty does not trust high national courts to interpret Community law 
on their own and requires that they refer any such matter to the Court of 
Justice,52 unless it has already been decided by the Court or its correct 
interpretation is acte clair.53 Ought Strasbourg to have a higher degree 
48  That is, Judges Küris, Levits, Lõhmus and Makarczyk.
49  Case C-466/00 Kaba v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] ECR I-2219, 
per opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer para 89.
50  See, to select one example, Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères v Directeur Général de la Concur-
rence [2002] ECR I-9011, in which the Court of Justice was required to re-assess its previous 
Hoechst (Cases 46/87 & 227/88 Hoechst v Commission [1989] ECR 2859) case law on the 
inviolability of premises in the light of intervening judgments of the Court of Human Rights.
51  See eg Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v 
Austria [2003] ECR I-5659 (right of assembly v free movement of goods); Case C-36/02 
Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt 
Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609 (human dignity v freedom to provide services). See also Case C-
341/05 Laval un Partneri v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet (pending) (collective indus-
trial action v freedom to provide services); Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ 
Federation v Viking Line (pending) (collective industrial action v right of establishment).
52  Art 234 EC Treaty para 3.
53  Cases 28-30/62 da Costa en Schaake v Nederlandse Belastingsadministratie [1963] ECR 
31; Case 283/81 CILFIT v Ministero della Sanità [1982] ECR 3415; Case C-495/03 Intermo-
dal Transports v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [2005] ECR I-8151.
367CYELP 3 [2007] 355-389
of faith in Luxembourg? - for unlike the event of a national court falling 
short on Convention standards, there is no right of petition from a Lux-
embourg judgment. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
required the Union to seek accession to the Convention,54 so removing 
the present treaty bar, and that provision is intended by the European 
Council to survive into the redrafted Reform Treaty;55 but it will also re-
quire, fi rst, amendment to the Convention itself, for it is ancillary to the 
Council of Europe, which at present is open for accession to states only; 
and second, serious consideration of the collaboration, and hierarchy, 
between Strasbourg and Luxembourg.
c) The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
This is the clearest, least nebulous, purpose built codifi cation of 
fundamental rights in Community law.56 It is the fruit of long debate 
within the Union on the nature of fundamental rights: the rights which 
ought to be embraced, whether they ought to be legally binding, and 
if so how, whether they ought to be incorporated into Treaty texts or 
simply ‘declared’, and if so by whom, whether they ought to bind (if any-
one) the Community/Union institutions only, the member states acting 
within Community/Union spheres, the member states in areas unrelat-
ed to Community law, and so on. In the event, the Charter is a fairly 
comprehensive codifi cation of essentially personal rights ‘recognised’ by 
the Union57 - 54 articles divided into seven chapters, addressing dignity, 
freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights, justice, and a fi nal chapter 
on general provisions. It is unique amongst international instruments in 
the breadth of its subject matter.
But the Charter does not form part of the Treaty. It was adopted at 
the Nice Summit in December 2000 by the Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission by ‘solemn proclamation’, so, however ‘solemn’, it is a 
product not of the constituent authorities of the Treaties (the Herren der 
Verträge) but of the three political institutions. This they had done once 
before,58 admittedly far less ambitiously, and to limited effect. Further, at 
54  Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe art I-9(2).
55  Draft Treaty on European Union (as amended by the Draft Treaty amending the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (the ‘Reform 
Treaty’); hereinafter Draft TEU) art 6(2).
56  For the present text of the Charter, see [2000] OJ C364/1.
57  Preamble, 7th indent.
58  ‘Joint Declaration on fundamental rights of the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission of 5 April 1977’ [1977] OJ C103/1. See also the Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (text reproduced in Social Europe 1/90), a declara-
tion agreed by eleven of the then twelve heads of state or government at the Strasbourg 
Summit in 1989, elements of which surface in the Charter.
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Nice the member states least enthusiastic of fundamental rights initia-
tives secured a victory of sorts. Article 51 of the Charter (within the chap-
ter on general provisions, defi ning the ‘Scope’ of the Charter) provides:
1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions 
and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of sub-
sidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing 
Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the prin-
ciples and promote the application thereof in accordance with their 
respective powers.
2. This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the 
Community or the Union, or modify powers and tasks defi ned by the 
Treaties.
There is real concern that the application of the Charter to the con-
duct of the member states ‘only when they are implementing [uniquement 
lorsqu’ils mettent en œuvre] Union law’ is a backward step, excluding 
judicial control over national measures which derogate from Community 
rules. There is as yet no judicial authority on this.
Even though outside the Treaties, the Charter yields greater preci-
sion to those rights already recognised as forming part of Community 
law. Within two months of its adoption it was being cited, with approba-
tion, by an Advocate-General as an aid to interpretation of a social policy 
directive.59 According to the Court of First Instance, ‘[a]lthough this docu-
ment does not have legally binding force, it does show the importance of 
the rights its sets out in the Community legal order.’60 And the Court of 
Justice fi nally took proper notice of it in 2006 in the Family Reunifi cation 
case,61 although in a compromise step it said the Charter had relevance 
insofar as it refl ected the constitutional traditions of or international ob-
ligations common to the member states. It is also incorporated from time 
to time expressly into Community legislation: Regulation 1/2003, for ex-
59  Case C-173/99 R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Broadcasting, 
Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union [2001] ECR I-4881, per opinion of AG 
Tizzano paras 26-28. For subsequent (approbatory) reference to the Charter by Advocates-
General, see Cases C-20 & 64/00 Booker Aquaculture v The Scottish Ministers [2003] ECR 
I-7411 (AG Mischo); Case C-181/03P Nardone v Commission [2005] ECR I-199 (AG Poiares 
Maduro); Cases C-387 etc/02 Berlusconi v Parliament [2005] ECR I-3565 (AG Kokott); Case 
C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769 (AG Kokott); Case C-105/04P Neder-
landse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektroteknisch Gebeid v Commission 
[2006] ECR I-8725 (AG Kokott); Case C-354/04P Gestoras Pro Amnistía v Council (ECJ 27 
February 2007) (AG Mengozzi); Case C-328/05P SGL Carbon v Commission (ECJ 10 May 
2007) (AG Mazák); Case C-305/05 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone v 
Conseil des Ministres (ECJ 26 June 2007) (AG Poiares Maduro).
60  Cases T-377 etc/00 Philip Morris International v Commission [2003] ECR II-1 para 122.
61  Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769.
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ample, the cornerstone of the (now) decentralised enforcement of Com-
munity competition rules, provides that
[t]his Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the 
principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. Accordingly, this Regulation should 
be interpreted and applied with respect to those rights and princi-
ples.62
This fi xes the Charter to the given fi eld of Community law and re-
quires its application thereto, at least insofar as a preambular reference 
has relevance to the application of a regulation; if nothing else it ought to 
concentrate the minds of the authorities wielding it. And the more often 
it is fl agged up, the more familiar it becomes.
However signifi cant a step the Charter may be, it may grow to be-
come more signifi cant still. Certainly ‘[t]he Commission considers that 
the Charter, by reason of its content, its tight drafting and its high politi-
cal and symbolic value, ought properly to be incorporated in the Treaties 
sooner or later.’63 It was in the event (intended to be) incorporated into 
the Treaties sooner, by the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
comprising Part II (of four Parts). There are minor, ‘though signifi cant, 
differences between the text of the Charter and the text adopted in the 
Constitution, but essentially they are the same thing. So, had the Treaty 
been ratifi ed, the Charter would have acquired ‘constitutional’ status, 
and its place within the Community/Union hierarchy of norms would 
be much clearer. The Constitutional Treaty now abandoned but much 
of it cannibalised in the Reform Treaty, the solution now proposed is, 
rather than Treaty incorporation, that the Union ‘recognises the rights, 
freedoms and principles set out in the Charter […] which shall have the 
same legal value as the Treaties’64 (emphasis added) and will have ‘le-
gally binding force’.65 This is a half-way house, designed primarily not 
to frighten the (British) horses; but it seems likely the Charter (in its 
Constitutional Treaty version)66 will, albeit through the back door, fi nally 
62  Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1, preamble, recital 
37.
63  EC Commission, ‘Communiqué on the Legal Nature of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union’ COM (2000) 644 fi nal, 11 October 2000 para 11.
64  Art 6(1) Draft TEU.
65  Draft Declaration (No 31) concerning the Charter of Fundamental Rights, para 1.
66  The European Council intends the Parliament, Council and Commission again solemnly 
to proclaim the Charter on the day the Reform Treaty is signed in the version agreed at the 
2004 IGC; draft Declaration (No 11) on the Proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission.
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gain Treaty stature and force. Thus ramped up, the Court of Justice will 
thereafter be charged with applying the Charter to the conduct of the in-
stitutions and the member states ‘only when they are implementing Un-
ion law’67 whilst continuing to respect ‘fundamental rights, as guaranteed 
by the European Convention’68 across the spectrum of Union activity. 
The Charter may therefore be of narrower application than the Conven-
tion (depending upon what ‘only when they are implementing Union law’ 
means), whilst even if it ‘confi rms the fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the European Convention’69 it may in substance be wider, the Convention 
forming a subset ratione materiae of the more broadly framed Charter. 
Therefore a robust application of the Charter will necessarily be on all 
fours with the Convention. A safeguard to this purpose may be found in 
the Charter itself:
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights 
shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive pro-
tection.70
The question is whether the Court of Justice will apply it robustly, 
or as robustly as Strasbourg would the Convention ‘corresponding rights’ 
which forms its core. Synergy between Charter and Convention may be 
achieved by other means, for example by the EU Network of Independ-
ent Experts on Fundamental Rights created in 2002 by the Commission 
upon a recommendation of the Parliament to report on human rights 
situations within the Union: it uses the Charter as its ‘reference instru-
ment’, but it is ‘indexed’ to international and European human rights 
law.71 But whilst it may come to achieve much, the Network marks yet 
further decentralisation of authority in the fi eld. 
Sanctions for non-compliance with human rights in the Union
Note must be taken of the sanctions now available where a member 
state fails to comply with its human rights obligations within the Union. 
Article 6 of the TEU, which applies to all Union (including Community) 
activity, provides:
67  Charter of Fundamental Rights art 51.
68  Art 6(3) Draft TEU.
69  Draft Declaration (No 31) (n 65) para 1.
70  Charter of Fundamental Rights art 52(3).
71  See the Network’s (fi rst annual) ‘Report on the Situation of Fundamental Rights in the 
European Union and its Member States in 2002’ (31 March 2003) 11-24.
371CYELP 3 [2007] 355-389
1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, re-
spect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of 
law, principles which are common to the Member States.
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention […].
In 1996 the Court of Justice said that the institutions had no power 
to adopt general rules on human rights.72 This was remedied, at least 
in the view of the Commission, by amendments made to article 7 of the 
TEU by the Treaty of Nice,73 article 7 now providing the authority and 
mechanism for the adoption of sanctions against a member state found 
‘serious[ly] and persistent[ly]’ to breach the principles set out in article 
6(1).74 The power of sanction applies in Union matters and is expressly 
carried over into the Community sphere75 but, according to the Commis-
sion, its scope is not confi ned to them.76 If this is so, the Union may vent 
its displeasure against a member state even where it is acting wholly 
within the national domain, or acting in some other way which has no 
Community/Union/Charter element. The closest practical instance of 
this is l’affaire autrichienne in 2000, in which 14 of the then 15 mem-
ber states sought to boycott Austria in a number of Community, Union 
and non-Union spheres in order to protest at the (minor) participation in 
federal government of the Freiheits Partei Österreich.77 But there was no 
72  Opinion 2/94 Re Accession to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759.
73  See EC Commission, ‘Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on 
Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union: Respect for and promotion of the values on 
which the Union is based’ (Communication) COM (2003) 606, 15 October 2003, 3: ‘the 
amended Article 7 confers new powers on the Commission in its monitoring of fundamental 
rights in the Union’.
74  Action taken under art 7 now takes two forms: fi rst (a Nice innovation), upon a ‘reasoned 
proposal’ from the Parliament, the Commission or one third of the member states, and with 
the assent of the Parliament (acting by a two-thirds majority vote representing a majority of 
MEPs), the Council may by a majority of four-fi fths of its members determine that there is a 
‘clear risk of a serious breach’ of art 6(1) and address appropriate recommendations (but no 
more) to the errant member state (art 7(1)). Second, upon a proposal from the Commission 
or one third of the member states, and with the (same weighted) assent of the Parliament, 
the Council, meeting in the composition of heads of state or government, may by unanimity 
(excepting the vote of the errant member state) determine the existence of a ‘serious and 
persistent breach’ of art 6(1), after which the Council may by qualifi ed majority suspend 
‘certain of’ the member state’s Treaty rights, including Council voting rights (art 7(2)-(5)).
75   Art 309 EC Treaty.
76  EC Commission, ‘Communication to the Council […] on Article 7’ (n 73) 5.
77  In the 1999 election the FPÖ won 27 percent of the popular vote, making it the second 
largest party in the Nationalrat, and agreed to form a collation government with the Öster-
reichische Volkspartei (ÖVP). This led to weekly demonstrations (the Donnerstagsdemon-
strationen) in Vienna and the boycott measures adopted by the other member states. The 
‘Statement of the XIV’ said this state of affairs would last ‘as long as necessary’, but crum-
bled after 7 months. It raises the interesting question of whether the boycott itself was 
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recourse, and the events cannot be taken as action adopted pursuant, to 
article 7; in fact a subsequent report exonerated Austria of human rights 
abuses of any kind.78 Nor has action been taken under article 7 following 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq against the member states party to it, notwith-
standing war of aggression being identifi ed by the European Parliament 
as ‘a clear risk of a breach […] or an actual breach’ of article 6.79 In the 
view of one commentator, ‘[i]f an external war and occupation of a sov-
ereign state did not create a prima facie situation for scrutiny it is hard 
to imagine any condition other than the most extreme form of tyrannical 
behaviour forcing a response.’80
Well, torture might constitute such a condition. Yet allegations of 
‘extraordinary rendition fl ights’ in and through a number of member 
states - refoulement prohibited (probably with the force of jus cogens) in 
international law,81 under the Convention82 and under the Charter,83 and 
prohibited absolutely84 - and of related torture in some member states, 
now confi rmed convincingly in the two ‘Marty Reports’ under the aus-
pices of the Council of Europe,85 have drawn no fi re. This is of course 
the major weakness of article 7, namely its fi erce procedural hurdles: if 
member states work together to a common purpose, or at least in mu-
tual contempt of fundamental rights, suffi cient support in the Council 
for effective action is unlikely to be mustered. It was hoped by some that 
consistent with the art 6(1) commitment to (Austrian) democracy, and if and how Austria 
(or an Austrian) might have challenged it on that ground. For discussion of the affair, see G 
de Búrca, ‘Beyond the Charter: How Enlargement has Enlarged the Human Rights Policy of 
the European Union’ (2004) 27 Fordham International Law Journal 679.
78  M Ahtisaari, J Frowein and M Oreja, ‘Report on the Austrian Government’s Commitment 
to the Common European Values, in particular concerning the rights of Minorities, Refu-
gees and Immigrants, and the Evolution of the Political Nature of the FPÖ (The Wise Men 
Report)’ (2001) 40 International Legal Materials 102.
79  European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, ‘Report on the Commission 
communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union: Respect for and promotion of 
the values on which the Union is based’ (1 April 2004) A5-0227/2004, 11.
80  A. Williams, ‘The Indifferent Gesture: Article 7 TEU, the Fundamental Rights Agency and 
the UK’s Invasion of Iraq’, (2006) 31 EL Rev 3, 11-12.
81  UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1984 (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 
UNTS 85 art 3.
82  Art 3 ECHR.
83  Charter of Fundamental Rights art 19(2).
84  Chahal v United Kingdom (App no 22414/93) (1997) 23 EHRR 413; also Ramzy v Neth-
erlands (App no 25424/05) (pending).
85  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human 
Rights, ‘Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees involving 
Council of Europe member states’ (7 June 2006) AS/Jur (2006) 16 and ‘Secret detentions 
and illegal transfer of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: second report’ 
(7 June 2007) AS/Jur (2007) 36.
373CYELP 3 [2007] 355-389
the European Agency for Fundamental Rights (EUAFR), which took up 
its duties in March 2007,86 would be afforded some formal role in the 
application of article 7, but they were to be denied. Its scope is further 
restricted to the application of Community law,87 which leaves it power-
less to pursue (alleged) Convention breaches by the Union under Titles 
V or VI and by member states in wholly national spheres. So the Agency 
may ‘assist’ in88 and ‘deal with’,89 for example, discrimination in employ-
ment law for its inconsistency with fundamental human rights, but not 
so invasion and torture.
The protection of human rights in Europe therefore still springs less 
from political institutions than from the courts - and increasingly, a dou-
ble act between the Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice. 
There is a slow growth of recognition - and slower still, respect - between 
the two courts. They now cite each other with increasing regularity and, 
more recently, approbation. It is natural for the Court of Justice to do so, 
the Treaty now citing the Convention and the Court of Human Rights an 
obvious authority in its interpretation, although the Court (as opposed to 
the Advocates-General) did so expressly for the fi rst time only in 1996.90 
The Court of Human Rights cited Luxembourg earlier91 but less frequent-
ly, and each now sometimes returns the courtesies.92 This may be likened 
to an (amicable) game of chess between Strasbourg and Luxembourg; 
put otherwise, ‘a symbiotic interaction of fragile complexity, continuously 
working out a solution to the sometimes awkward co-existence of the EU 
and the ECHR’.93 In order best to understand whither this danse judicaire 
has now led us, and the (precarious) balance now struck, it will be nec-
essary to consider four recent judgments, two from Strasbourg and two 
from Luxembourg.
86  Council Regulation (EC) 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ L53/1. The Agency replaced, and succeeded to 
the responsibilities of, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia; like the 
Centre before it, it has its seat in Vienna.
87  Ibid art 3.
88  Ibid art 2.
89  Ibid art 3(3).
90  Case C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143.
91  For the fi rst time in Marckx v Belgium (App no 6833/74) (1979) 2 EHRR 330, and not 
again until the 1990s.
92  In Case C-13/94 P v S (n 90), Luxembourg cited Strasbourg in Rees v United Kingdom 
(App no 9532/81) (1986) 9 EHRR 56; Strasbourg cited P v S in turn in Goodwin v United 
Kingdom (App no 28975/95) (2002) 35 EHRR 447, and Luxembourg then cited Goodwin 
in Case C-117/01 K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency [2004] ECR I-541. On 
the growing mutual support between the two courts, see S Douglas-Scott, ‘A Tale of Two 
Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis’ (2006) 
43 CML Rev 629, 640-652.
93  Douglas-Scott (n 92) 631.
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3. Matthews
Miss Matthews was a citizen and resident of Gibraltar, part of Her 
Majesty’s dominions for which the United Kingdom is responsible in in-
ternational (and Community) law, but constitutionally distinct from the 
UK. In accordance with article 227(4) of the EC Treaty, it became part of 
the Community with UK accession in 1973, but it is not part of the cus-
toms territory, and in many ways is treated as a third country. Citizens of 
Gibraltar are citizens of the Union.94 Accordingly, in 1994 Miss Matthews 
petitioned the Chief Electoral Offi ce of Gibraltar to be registered as a voter 
for the elections to be held that year to the European Parliament. He re-
plied that both the ‘Act’ Concerning the Election of the Representatives of 
the Assembly by Direct Universal Suffrage95 and the UK legislation giving 
effect to it96 limited the franchise to the territory of the United Kingdom. 
She therefore had no vote.
The Convention extends to Gibraltar by virtue of a 1953 declaration 
made by the UK government; Protocol 1 was made effective there by vir-
tue of a 1988 declaration. Miss Matthews therefore claimed a violation of 
protocol 1, article 3, taken alone or in conjunction with article 14 of the 
Convention. Article 3 of protocol 1 provides: ‘The High Contracting Par-
ties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret bal-
lot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion 
of the people in the choice of the legislature.’ Article 14 of the Convention 
prohibits discrimination in the application of the Convention, but in the 
event the Court found it unnecessary to consider.
The issue here for present purposes was that the measure which it 
was claimed infringed the Convention was a measure adopted under the 
three Community treaties. More accurately, it was a peculiar instrument 
envisaged in, and called for by, the Treaty97 but was not an act of the 
institutions acting under Treaty authority (which is normally the case), 
rather it was adopted in the form of a decision of the Council composed 
of representatives of the member states (‘the member states au sein du 
Conseil’) and acting unanimously, and made effective by its subsequent 
ratifi cation by all member states. Once in force it acquired Treaty sta-
tus. Because it was a measure adopted by the Communities it could not 
be challenged before the Court of Human Rights because they are not 
contracting parties to the Convention. And nor could it be challenged in 
Luxembourg, for it was not a normal Community act, rather it had treaty 
94  British Nationality Act 1981, ss 15ff, 50(1), Sch 6; Declaration by the United Kingdom 
replacing the [1972] Declaration on the Defi nition of the term ‘Nationals’ [1983] OJ C23/1.
95  [1976] OJ L278/1.
96  The European Parliamentary Elections Act 1978.
97  Art 138(3) EEC Treaty.
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status and was beyond the reach of the Court of Justice. The issue was 
therefore whether the United Kingdom could be held accountable for the 
(alleged) breach of the Convention.
The Commission of Human Rights (the case having been raised be-
fore the Commission became redundant in 1998) found the application 
admissible but by 11 votes to 6 found that there had been no violation 
of article 3 of protocol 1. The Court (by 15 votes to 2) disagreed.98 Article 
1 of the Convention requires the High Contracting Parties to ‘secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defi ned in [the] 
Convention’. It makes no distinction as to the type of rule or measure con-
cerned, and does not exclude any part of the member States’ ‘jurisdiction’ 
from scrutiny. But can the UK be responsible for a rule adopted by Com-
munity authorities, from which there was no derogation and which could 
be changed only with the consent of all member states?
The Community is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Hu-
man Rights. But whilst it does not object to transfer of state competences 
to an international organisation, the Convention requires that its rights 
continue to be ‘secured’. Member States’ responsibility therefore contin-
ues and survives even after such a transfer.
Here then is the answer, the Strasbourg view of the continuing place 
of the Convention in Community (and Union) law, and implicitly article 
30 of the Vienna Convention and article 307 of the EC Treaty. It is a 
half-way house, put with greater clarity in another, contemporaneous 
judgment:
[W]here States establish international organisations in order to pur-
sue or strengthen their cooperation in certain fi elds of activities, and 
where they attribute to these organisations certain competences and 
accord them immunities, there may be implications as to the protec-
tion of fundamental rights. It would be incompatible with the pur-
pose and object of the Convention, however, if the Contracting States 
were thereby absolved from their responsibility under the Conven-
tion in relation to the fi eld of activity covered by such attribution.99
Convention rights continue to subsist even between and amongst 
the Community member states and their citizens. Yet the creation of the 
Community and its forays into fundamental rights are compatible with 
98  Matthews v United Kingdom (App no 24833/94) (1999) 28 EHRR 361.
99  Waite & Kennedy v Federal Republic of Germany (App no 26083/94) (1999) 30 EHRR 261 
para 67. In fact the subsisting obligations of a contracting party to the Convention in the 
face of subsequent international obligations was indicated by the Commission of Human 
Rights as early as 1958: X v Federal Republic of Germany (App no 342/57) (4 September 
1958, unreported). 
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the Convention provided that Convention rights ‘receive an equivalent 
protection’100 or continue to be ‘secured’.101 This accords with the (subse-
quent) opinion of the EU network of independent experts on fundamental 
rights:
Where contracting parties fail to take human rights properly into 
account, or where a treaty leads to infringements of human rights 
whether or not such violations could be anticipated when the treaty 
was concluded, the parties concerned can be held responsible for 
such violations: the obligation to secure the enjoyment of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms continues to exist after the con-
clusion of a treaty with third parties. This is in conformity with the 
rule expressed in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties […].102
It is also entirely in harmony with the legal thinking of the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht in its Solange I judgment.103
Here, the violation fl ows from a Community act, entered into by the 
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom, together with all other member 
states, is responsible ratione materiae under article 1 of the Convention 
and, in this case in particular, under article 3 of protocol 1, for the conse-
quences of the Treaty. The Court therefore found for Miss Matthews, who 
recovered no damages (she had claimed none) but was awarded costs 
and, from the 2004 European elections, the right to vote.104
So Matthews tells us that Convention responsibilities and Conven-
tion jurisdiction remain alive for the member states even within the Com-
munity cocoon. The Community may succeed to the member states’ obli-
gations under the Convention, but if the Community fails to comply with 
them, the responsibility of the member state will reassert itself. The prob-
lem with Matthews is that the issue involved the application of a Commu-
nity measure which was beyond the control of the Court of Justice. This 
100  M & Co. v Germany (App no 13258/87) (1990) 64 DR 138, 145.
101  Matthews (n 98) para 32.
102  ‘Opinion No 3-2006: The Human Rights Responsibilities of the EU Member States in the 
Context of the C.I.A. Activities in Europe (“Extraordinary Renditions”)’ (25 May 2006) 10.
103  BVerfG, 29. Mai 1974, BVerfGE 37, 271.
104  The UK law adopted to comply with the judgment of the Court (the European Parlia-
mentary (Representation) Act 2003) was challenged before the Court of Justice by Spain 
(Case C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-7917, one of the very rare cases of 
enforcement proceedings raised under art 227 by a member state) on the grounds that the 
peculiarity of UK electoral law which grants full voting rights to resident non-UK Common-
wealth citizens, and so enfranchising for elections to the European Parliament (some one 
hundred) non-citizens of the Union resident in Gibraltar, infringed various provisions of the 
Treaty. The Court disagreed, fi nding Community law not to preclude a member state from 
enfranchising third country nationals ‘who have close links to [it]’ (para 78).
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does not happen often, most Community law is reviewable by the Court; 
this was not. The question is then whether Convention responsibility will 
survive where there is control (effective or otherwise) in Luxembourg.
4. Jégo-Quéré and Unión de Pequeños Agricultores
It was anticipated that the test would come in the context of article 
6 of the Convention, which provides for and requires effective judicial 
protection of rights. In 2002 there was some excitement in Community 
circles when the Court of Justice began to play with the Treaty scheme 
for the judicial protection of the individual before it - in essence the ques-
tion of whether individual access to the Court under article 230 of the EC 
Treaty for the judicial challenge of a Community measure, as fi rst defi ned 
in the Plaumann judgment,105 afforded adequate protection for the rights 
of the individual. Advocate-General Jacobs thought not: he proposed that 
the Community system was inadequate; it was arbitrary; it was restric-
tive; it was discriminatory; it would in many cases require the individual 
to breach the law, and sometimes criminal law, in order to trigger judicial 
review of the law. This situation ‘does not offer the individual an adequate 
means of judicial protection. Individuals clearly cannot be required to 
breach the law in order to gain access to justice.’106 Therefore he said, 
the Community system was incompatible with the principle of effective 
judicial protection (implicitly as required by article 6 of the Convention), 
and proposed a signifi cant re-evaluation of the case law under article 
230, so that
an individual should be regarded as individually concerned within 
the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC by a Com-
munity measure where, by reason of his particular circumstances, 
the measure has, or is liable to have, a substantial adverse effect on 
his interests.107
Before the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in the case the 
Court of First Instance intervened, and in an unrelated case agreed in 
principle with Mr Jacobs, although altered the substance of the test 
somewhat:
[A] natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned 
by a Community measure of general application that concerns him 
directly if the measure in question affects his legal position, in a 
105  Case 25/62 Plaumann v EEC Commission [1963] ECR 95.
106  Case C-50/00P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, para 43 
of his opinion.
107  Ibid para 103.
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manner which is both defi nite and immediate, by restricting his 
rights or by imposing obligations on him. The number and position 
of other persons who are likewise affected by the measure, or who 
may be so, are of no relevance in that regard.108
But, as is well known, the Court of Justice disagreed. The present 
system was quite adequate: the restricted access to the Court was a Trea-
ty requirement, which could not be altered not by the Court but only by 
the member states, by treaty amendment. Until that should happen, it 
is the responsibility of the member states to ensure the existence of a 
system of legal remedies and procedures which adequately guarantee the 
right to effective judicial protection.109
The judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores was one of the full 
Court (13 judges), and one clearly intended to constitute an arrêt de 
principe on the matter; it has been reconfi rmed since.110 But it seems to a 
number of commentators that it is clearly wrong, and it is wrong because 
it was inconsistent with the Convention, in particular, of course, article 
6. There was a feeling abroad that this may well be the Luxembourg view, 
but should Strasbourg ever be afforded the opportunity of pronouncing 
a view of the subject, however diffi cult that may be, the answer would be 
very different.
Strasbourg has now had the opportunity. And the answer is surpris-
ing.
5. Bosphorus
In 1992 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS, an airline 
charter company registered in Turkey with its seat in Istanbul, leased 
two aircraft from JAT, the national airline of the former Yugoslavia. The 
lease was for a period of 48 months from the dates of delivery of the two 
aircraft (22 April and 6 May 1992). The two aircraft were registered under 
the Turkish fl ag as foreseen by the lease.
In May 1993 one of the aircraft arrived in Dublin for maintenance 
work by an Irish company. A month earlier the UN Security Council had 
adopted a resolution111 requiring all UN states to impound, inter alia, all 
aircraft in their territories ‘in which a majority or controlling interest is 
held by a person or undertaking in or operating’ from the former Yugoslav 
Republic. The resolution was implemented in and for the Community by 
108  Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré v Commission [2002] ECR II-2365 para 51.
109  Case C-50/00P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (n 106).
110  Case C-167/02P Rothley v Parliament [2004] ECR I-3149; Case C-263/02P Commission 
v Jégo-Quéré [2004] ECR I-3425.
111  UNSC Res 820 (1993) UN Doc S/RES/ 820.
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a regulation which entered into force at the end of April.112 In June, in ac-
cordance with Irish law giving effect to the regulation,113 the Minister for 
Transport impounded the aircraft.
In November 1993 Bosphorus challenged the Minister’s decision be-
fore the High Court. The High Court interpreted the Community regu-
lation not to apply to the aircraft, and so the Minister had acted ultra 
vires.114 The Minister then re-imposed his decision, and at the same time 
appealed the judgment of the High Court to the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court decided it was bound to refer the question to the Court 
of Justice under article 234, and accordingly asked it, in effect, whether 
the aircraft was caught by, and the situation fell within, the regulation. 
The Advocate-General (Jacobs) addressed the question of fundamental 
rights at length, included amongst them a right to peaceful enjoyment of 
property, found a severe interference with Bosphorus’s property rights, 
but that in the circumstances it was justifi ed and not disproportionate. 
The Court agreed:
Article 8 of Regulation No 990/93 applies to an aircraft which is 
owned by an undertaking based in or operating from the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) even though the owner 
has leased it for four years to another undertaking, neither based 
in nor operating from that republic and in which no person or un-
dertaking based in or operating from that republic has a majority or 
controlling interest.115
Four weeks later the Minister re-instated the impounding of the air-
craft.
In 1997, following lapse of the lease and relaxation of the sanctions 
regime, the aircraft was returned to JAT (but which, to add insult to in-
jury, was required to pay IR£389,609.95 to cover parking, maintenance, 
insurance and legal costs). In March Bosphorus lodged a complaint 
against Ireland with the European Commission of Human Rights, which 
was then transmitted to the Court. Essentially the complaint alleged a 
breach of article 1 of protocol 1, which provides:
112  Council Regulation (EEC) 990/93 of 26 April 1993 concerning trade between the Euro-
pean Economic Community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
gro) [1993] OJ L102/14.
113  The European Communities (Prohibition of Trade with the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via (Serbia and Montenegro)) Regulations 1993 (SI 144 of 1993).
114  Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret v Minister for Transport [1994] 2 ILRM 551.
115  Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret v Minister for Transport, Ireland 
[1996] ECR I-3953 para 27.
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Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of 
his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except 
in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by 
law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the 
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control 
the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to se-
cure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
The case was assigned to the Grand Chamber of the Court. It gave 
its judgment in June 2005.116
What was remarkable in the judgment was the extensive consid-
eration of Community law and practice by Strasbourg. The Luxembourg 
court makes increasing reference to Strasbourg case law (the Advocates-
General extensively so), but here the shoe was on the other foot. The 
Court of Human Rights considered, and discussed at length:
• the development of the Luxembourg case law on fundamental 
rights;
• the Treaty provisions, particularly article 6 TEU, the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights and the provisions of the constitutional Treaty;
• the application of articles 10, 249 and 307 of the EC Treaty;
• the mechanisms of judicial protection in Community law, in par-
ticular articles 230, 232, 241, 288, direct effect, indirect effect, state 
liability and article 234, and the extent of judicial protection afforded 
the individual, citing Unión de Pequeños Agricultores at considerable 
length.117
As to substance, the Irish government argued that the state was 
bound by the Luxembourg ruling. To do otherwise, even with a view to 
Convention compliance, would be contrary to its obligation of ‘loyal co-
operation’ required by Community law. It argued essentially that Lux-
embourg and Strasbourg human rights protection were of an equivalent 
quality, and relied essentially upon M & Co., the 1990 decision of the 
Commission of Human Rights118 which found inadmissible a Convention 
challenge to a German measure enforcing a sanction (a pecuniary fi ne) 
adopted by the European Commission - as a national authority is obliged 
automatically to do119 - in the sphere of competition law because that 
would usurp the proper jurisdiction of the Community Court; the avail-
116  Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret v Ireland (App no 45036/98) (2006) 42 EHRR 1.
117  Ibid para 85.
118  M & Co. v Germany (n 100).
119  Art 256 EC Treaty.
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ability of a Luxembourg remedy, said the Irish government, distinguished 
this case from Matthews.
Bosphorus distinguished M & Co. as an act of an international or-
ganisation over the elaboration of which the member state had no infl u-
ence and in the execution of which the state had no discretion. Since it 
was not challenging the provisions of Regulation 990/93 or the sanctions 
regime per se, any ‘equivalent protection’ principle of the M & Co. was 
not relevant. On the contrary, Ireland had been intimately involved in the 
adoption and application of the regulation and had, at all material times, 
a real and reviewable discretion as to the means by which the result re-
quired by it could be achieved. More generally, while the Convention did 
not exclude the transfer of competences to international organisations, 
the member state had to continue to secure Convention rights, otherwise 
it could escape its Convention responsibility once its courts referred a 
question and implemented a Luxembourg ruling. This would create an 
unacceptable lacuna of human rights protection in Europe. And in any 
event, Community law did not offer ‘equivalent protection’, and the pro-
cedure of article 234 of the EC Treaty was inadequate to ensure the level 
of protection required by article 6 of the Convention.
The EC Commission, as intervener, argued that whilst a State re-
tained some Convention responsibility after it had ceded powers to an in-
ternational organisation, that responsibility was fulfi lled once there was 
proper provision in that organisation’s structure for effective protection 
of fundamental rights at a level at least ‘equivalent’ to that of the Conven-
tion. It therefore supported the approach adopted in M & Co. Ireland had 
no discretion here.
The Court found after extensive consideration, that what was at is-
sue was not the result of an exercise of discretion by the Irish authorities, 
either under Community or Irish law, but rather amounted to compliance 
by the Irish State with its legal obligations fl owing from EC law and, in 
particular, article 8 of Regulation 990/93. Then:
[T]he Court has recognised that absolving Contracting States com-
pletely from their Convention responsibility in the areas covered by 
such a transfer would be incompatible with the purpose and object 
of the Convention: the guarantees of the Convention could be limited 
or excluded at will thereby depriving it of its peremptory character 
and undermining the practical and effective nature of its safeguards. 
The State is considered to retain Convention liability in respect of 
treaty commitments subsequent to the entry into force of the Con-
vention.
In the Court’s view, State action taken in compliance with such le-
gal obligations is justifi ed as long as the relevant organisation is 
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considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the sub-
stantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their 
observance, in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent 
to that for which the Convention provides. By ‘equivalent’ the Court 
means ‘comparable’: any requirement that the organisation’s protec-
tion be ‘identical’ could run counter to the interest of international 
co-operation pursued. However, any such fi nding of equivalence 
could not be fi nal and would be susceptible to review in the light of 
any relevant change in fundamental rights’ protection.
If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the 
organisation, the presumption will be that a State has not departed 
from the requirements of the Convention when it does no more than 
implement legal obligations fl owing from its membership of the or-
ganisation. However, any such presumption can be rebutted if, in 
the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the pro-
tection of Convention rights was manifestly defi cient. In such cases, 
the interest of international cooperation would be outweighed by the 
Convention’s role as a ‘constitutional instrument of European public 
order’ in the fi eld of human rights […].
Since the impugned act constituted solely compliance by Ireland 
with its legal obligations fl owing from membership of the EC, the 
Court will now examine whether a presumption arises that Ireland 
complied with its Convention requirements in fulfi lling such obliga-
tions and whether any such presumption has been rebutted in the 
circumstances of the present case.120
As to whether or not the presumption could or should be rebutted 
here, the Court examined the development of fundamental rights in Com-
munity law, and observed that although individual access to the Court 
in Luxembourg was limited, the availability of remedies before a national 
court ‘greatly enlarged the role of the domestic courts in the enforcement 
of Community law and its fundamental rights’ guarantees.’121 Then,
‘[i]n [the present] circumstances, the Court fi nds that the protection 
of fundamental rights by EC law can be considered to be, and to 
have been at the relevant time, ‘equivalent’ to that of the Convention 
system. Consequently, the presumption arises that Ireland did not 
depart from the requirements of the Convention when it implement-
ed legal obligations fl owing from its membership of the EC.122
120  Bosphorus (n 116) paras 154-158.
121  Ibid para 164.
122  Ibid para 165.
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Finally, it went on the fi nd that there was no reason by which the 
presumption could be rebutted in the case, found ‘no dysfunction of the 
mechanisms of control of the observance of Convention rights’,123 and 
therefore found no violation of the Convention.
6. Where We Are Now
The judgment in Bosphorus was a unanimous judgment, all 17 judg-
es agreeing, of the Grand Chamber, and so a serious and authoritative 
contribution to the debate. Where does it lead us? First, it illustrates 
and reinforces the multi-level structure of fundamental rights protection 
in the European legal order. At fi rst blush the logic of the judgment is 
reminiscent of that of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Solange II124 and 
in the Bananas judgment.125 But in fact the logic applies in reverse, and 
Strasbourg is showing a deference to Luxembourg which, fi rst, Luxem-
bourg never allows national courts, and second, is perhaps not wholly 
reassuring. At its core the problem is the differences in jurisdiction and 
legal culture between Luxembourg and Strasbourg, and the hierarchical 
relationship (if it exists) between the two. Luxembourg will not tolerate, 
for example, the German Basic Law reserving to German courts a funda-
mental rights jurisdiction because Community law must be uniform. Why 
this should be a less pressing concern for Strasbourg, mutatis mutandis, 
is not clear. And can it ever be uniform when applied by the two courts? 
Does this mean lesser human rights protection in the 27 European states 
contracting parties to the Convention and within the Union and greater 
in the 19 outside? Or can a higher Union standard (should it exist) fl ow 
the other way, so that Community judges are instrumental in shaping 
the meaning of the Convention as it applies, say, in the Russian Federa-
tion?
There is one comforting difference in this comparison: it appears 
from the Bananas judgment that Karslruhe now requires a general or 
very signifi cant abnegation by Luxembourg of duty to protect human 
rights before it will resuscitate its jurisdiction and intervene,126 whilst 
Bosphorus seems to stand for the proposition that the presumption of 
compliance is rebuttable upon a case by case basis: ‘The concept of a 
presumption of Convention compliance should not be interpreted as ex-
cluding a case by case review by this Court of whether there was really 
a breach of the Convention.’127 If it discharges this review jurisdiction 
123  Ibid para 166.
124  BVerfG, 22. Oktober 1986, BVerfGE 73, 339.
125  BVerfG, 7. Juni 2000, BVerfGE 102, 147.
126  Ibid § II(d).
127  Per opinion of Judge Ress para 2.
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robustly, there is maybe little to fear. But the entrails are not wholly en-
couraging. There is a presumption of Convention compatibility which will 
be rebutted only where the Court of Human Rights fi nds the protection 
of Convention rights ‘manifestly defi cient’.128 Does this mean outrageous? 
And by whose standards? Some would judge Unión de Pequeños Agricul-
tores to be outrageous. It is analogous, and maybe equivalent, to the lines 
in the sand drawn by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the Solange I,129 
subsequently Bananas,130 and the qualitatively different Maastricht judg-
ments,131 or the ‘ekstraordinære situation’ mooted by the Danish Højest-
eret132 which would justify it departing from Community law should the 
institutions come to exceed the limits ‘entrusted’ to them133 by the Danish 
law of accession. But these are widely perceived to be judicial nuclear 
weapons never likely to be deployed. It may be the same for Strasbourg’s 
latent authority. The test would come, and the fi reworks begin, should 
a Luxembourg judgment ever be ‘set aside’ by Strasbourg. Not only is 
this procedurally diffi cult and the outcome diffi cult to predict, it seems 
increasingly unlikely ever to happen.
But it is not wholly impossible. The judgment in Bosphorus includes 
a shot across Luxembourg’s bow on matters of review of Community 
measures in the separate, concurring opinion of Judge Ress,134 who is as 
much a Community lawyer as he is a human rights lawyer:
This judgment demonstrates how important it will be for the Euro-
pean Union to accede to the European Convention of Human Rights 
in order to make the control mechanism of the Convention complete, 
even if this judgment has left the so-called M. & Co. approach far 
behind. It has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction ratione loci, personae 
and materiae under Article 1 of the Convention, clearly departing 
from an approach which would declare the European Communities 
(EC) immune, even indirectly, from any supervision by this Court 
[...]. 
[…] The Court has not addressed the question of whether this limited 
access [of individuals to the Court of Justice] is really in accordance 
with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and whether the provisions, in 
particular, of […] Article [230] should not be interpreted more ex-
128  Bosphorus (n 116) para 156.
129  BVerfG, 29. Mai 1974, BVerfGE 37, 271.
130  BVerfG, 7. Juni 2000 (n 125).
131  BVerfG, 12. Oktober 1993, BVerfGE 89, 155.
132  Dom af 6. april 1998, UfR 1998 800.
133  Danmarks Riges Grundlov § 20.
134  There were two separate concurring opinions, the fi rst of a group of six judges (Rozakis, 
Tulkens, Traja, Botoucharova, Zagrebelsky and Garlicki), the second of Judge Ress.
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tensively in the light of Article 6 § 1, a point that was in issue before 
both the Court of First Instance and the ECJ in the case of Jégo-
Quéré & Cie SA v Commission and Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v 
Council. One should not infer from […] the judgment in the present 
case that the Court accepts that Article 6 § 1 does not call for a more 
extensive interpretation […]. The Court’s analysis of the ‘equivalence’ 
of the protection is a rather formal one […]. In my view, one can not 
say for once and for all that, in relation to all Convention rights, 
there is already such a presumption of Convention compliance be-
cause of the mere formal system of protection by the ECJ.135
Herein lies some comfort for those who support greater Strasbourg 
activism and mistrust the human rights jurisprudence of the Community 
courts. It does not leave Luxembourg the last word. But it makes the 
practical protection of human rights within the Community/Union little 
clearer.
Strasbourg will presumably remain steadfast in those cases of Com-
munity measures which cannot be brought within Luxembourg’s juris-
diction, as it was in Matthews. And it is of key importance to note that 
this applies in ever widening fi elds. First, there are extensive tangencies 
between Convention matters and Union activities under Titles V and VI 
of the TEU but much of Union activity (and some related Community 
activity) escapes Luxembourg scrutiny altogether.136 If, say, the Council 
adopts a framework decision under Title VI which is then implemented 
by a measure of transformation adopted by a national authority in a 
member state which has not made a declaration under article 35(2) of the 
TEU, Luxembourg is effectively barred from reviewing it; but in light of 
Matthews the member state may be called to account before its national 
courts and, ultimately, Strasbourg. The variable geometry of this - as 
well as support for the view held by some that Luxembourg is overly def-
erential to the Community (or here, Union) legislature - is apparent over 
135  Opinion of Judge Ress paras 1, 2.
136  See Art 35 TEU, which allows for references to be made to the Court of Justice from 
national courts on the validity and interpretation of some Title VI measures but only if the 
relevant member state has made an enabling declaration to that effect under art 35(2), so 
introducing a degree of ‘judicial variable geometry’ into the Court’s jurisdiction. The nec-
essary declarations have been made by 14 member states - that is, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal, Finland and Sweden. This applies mutatis mutandis under Title IV of the 
EC Treaty (on visas, asylum, immigration and the free movement of persons), art 68 limiting 
the reference power to courts of fi nal instance and expressly ousting from the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice art 62(1) matters (on abolition of controls on the trans-frontier move-
ment of persons) if they relate to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of 
internal security.
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the European arrest warrant,137 which was given a clean bill of health by 
the Court of Justice138 but has failed to pass human rights muster in the 
constitutional courts of at least two member states.139 The Court of Jus-
tice had jurisdiction to consider the validity of the framework decision in 
Advocaten voor de Wereld because the Belgian Arbitragehof enjoyed the 
authority to ask the question; this would not be the case for the courts 
of 13 other member states. Are the courts of those 13 member states 
bound by, or even entitled to take notice of, the validity of the framework 
decision as determined in the judgment? Does it mean standards will be 
higher (or at least different) there, with Strasbourg alone competent to 
determine its human rights compatibility?
Perhaps even more worrying are the legal obligations emanating 
from outwith even the Union, and in particular the new, post-cold war 
activism of the UN Security Council. On substance the Security Coun-
cil is probably bound in its conduct by the UN Charter, jus cogens, and 
universal instruments such as, for example, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.140 These are worthy enough, but they are in 
comparison with the Convention and the Charter rudimentary. Do we 
wish the will of the Security Council to be free of them within Europe? 
And on simple procedure, who will protect us from the Security Council? 
Not the Hague, because the individual cannot invoke the jurisdiction of 
that Court. Not Luxembourg, for, as we now know, the Court of Justice 
will neither review nor otherwise interfere with the application of a Secu-
rity Council resolution except insofar as it constitutes a breach of jus co-
gens.141 And not Strasbourg, if it places too much trust in Luxembourg.
The next chapter is likely to involve yet more Treaty-entrenched vari-
able geometry, addressing the Charter itself. At the June 2007 Europe-
an Council in Brussels which agreed the ‘draft IGC mandate’ which has 
breathed life back into the Constitutional Treaty, the United Kingdom 
secured, as a price of its agreement, the promise of an opt-out from the 
137  The ‘European arrest warrant’ was introduced as a 2002 framework decision (Frame-
work Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L190/1) by authority of arts 31(a) 
and (b) and 34(2)(b) TEU - that is, a Title VI measure.
138  Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld v Leden van de Ministerraad (ECJ 3 May 
2007).
139  National laws giving effect to the framework decision were struck down by the Trybunal 
Konstytucyjny (27 kwietnia 2005 r., P 1/05 (Europejski Nakaz Aresztowania)) and the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht (BVerfG, 18. Juli 2005 (Europäischer Haftbefehl-Beschluß), BVerfGE 
113, 273), albeit not for Convention incompatibility but for breaching the human rights 
guarantees of the Polish constitution and the German Basic Law, respectively.
140  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, en-
tered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.
141  Case T-306/01 Yusuf v Council and Commission [2005] ECR I-3533.
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Charter, in the form of a protocol to be annexed to the Treaties in the fol-
lowing terms:
1. The Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice, 
or any court or tribunal of the United Kingdom, to fi nd that the 
laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of 
the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, 
freedoms and principles that it reaffi rms.
2. In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV of 
the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to the United King-
dom except in so far as the United Kingdom has provided for such 
rights in its national law.
[…]
To the extent that a provision of the Charter refers to national laws 
and practices, it shall only apply in the United Kingdom to the extent 
that the rights or principles that it contains are recognised in the law 
or practices of the United Kingdom.142
It has since transpired that, with much less fanfare, Ireland and Po-
land have secured, and are reserving their positions on, a right to opt out 
of the Charter in a similar fashion.143 Whilst there is still much to play for 
in the intergovernmental conference, it must be assumed, especially as it 
‘will be conducted under the overall responsibility of the Heads of State or 
Government’,144 that the protocol will fi nd its way into the fi nal text.
The next question is, what does it mean? There is the peculiar em-
phasis upon Title IV of the Charter (‘Solidarity’), which deals with so-
cial rights such as worker participation, collective bargaining, protection 
from unfair dismissal, protection in the workplace and social security 
and social assistance; whilst these are areas of Community authority 
traditionally anathema to British governments, and this is (indirectly) 
re-emphasised in article 2 of the protocol,145 there is no indication as to 
142  Draft Protocol (No 7) on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the 
United Kingdom arts 1 and 2.
143  ‘State gets opt-out clause in EU rights charter’ The Irish Times (Dublin 26 June 2007) 1. 
This is substantiated by a footnote in the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European 
Council (Doc 11177/07 Concl 2 Annex 1 point 5 fn 20) that ‘two [unidentifi ed] delegations 
reserved the right to join in this Protocol’.
144  ‘Presidency Conclusions’ (ibid) para 12.
145  Art 2 purports to restrict the application in the United Kingdom of Charter provisions 
informed by national laws and practices, but virtually all of these are to be found in Title 
IV; that is, art 27 (worker participation), art 28 (collective bargaining), art 30 (unjustifi ed 
dismissal), art 34 (social security and social assistance), art 35 (health care) and art 36 
(access to services of general economic interest). The only exceptions are art 9 (right to 
marry), art 10 (conscientious objection), art 14 (education) and art 16 (the right to conduct 
a business).
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why they are to enjoy such pre-eminence in the protocol. If the intention 
is merely to emphasise Title IV, the pudding may have been over-egged: 
the link with the fi rst paragraph is ‘for the avoidance of doubt’, rather 
than the more common (at least in British style) ‘for greater certainty’, 
sometimes with the added emphasis of ‘but not so as to restrict the gen-
erality of the foregoing’, and it may result in Title IV matters being severed 
from the rest of the Charter and the fi rst paragraph being read down to 
that extent; it mimics the opt-out of the Social Protocol and Agreement 
the United Kingdom ‘enjoyed’ from 1993 to 1998,146 if through the back 
door, and would in any event be largely Convention compatible, because 
it is more Charter of Fundamental Social Rights than Convention terri-
tory. If taken to a wider amplitude, the Charter will not ‘extend’ (étend; 
ausdehnen) the ‘abilities’ (faculté; Befugnis) of competent courts across 
the fi elds of Charter application. These are provisions which betray ei-
ther ignorance of legal terminology (‘ability’ of a court?) and logic (extend 
whence?) or an unfathomable intent. But read generously, their inten-
tion, and maybe their effect, is to oust from the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Justice and of British courts the power to measure British laws against 
the Charter when, necessarily (because the Charter is of no wider ap-
plication), they implement Union law. If so it may represent a signifi cant 
own goal, for if the Court of Justice is deprived of it its normal task of 
review of national legislation for Charter compatibility, it may be inviting 
others to fi ll the gap, leaving British law bared to Convention control by 
Strasbourg by default - more Matthews than Bosphorus - and, reverting 
back to Judge Wildhaber’s détriplement fonctionnel,147 in the hands of 
national courts unmoderated by Luxembourg deference; and since the 
incorporation of the Convention into UK law in 1998,148 British courts 
have shown themselves not to be reticent in using it.
In the end the protocol may apply to the United Kingdom alone, or 
it may within the IGC become infectious, in which case any achievement 
in ‘recognising’ the Charter and its legally binding force is diminished. 
But its important may be more political: doubtless the opt-out will meet 
with the approval of the British House of Commons, and would appeal to 
the British people in the event of the referendum once promised but now 
withheld. It is not clear the Irish would be so sanguine: it would be ironic 
146  By virtue of agreement reached at Maastricht the United Kingdom was absolved of ad-
herence to much of Community social legislation. The mechanism for giving effect to this 
opt-out was contained in a protocol to the EC Treaty (the Protocol on Social Policy). Follow-
ing agreement with the Labour government elected in 1997, the legislation was extended to 
the United Kingdom and the Social Protocol was subsequently deleted from the Treaty by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam with its entry into force in 1999.
147  See n 1.
148  Human Rights Act 1998.
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if the Constitutional Treaty, having after a two year ‘period of refl ection’ 
emulated Lazarus in the form of the Reform Treaty, were again to fall 
upon the popular will, in the (compulsory) Irish referendum prior to rati-
fi cation149 owing to efforts by the government to withhold from the Irish 
people Charter rights enjoyed in (most) other member states.
149  Alone amongst the member states (with the possible exception of Slovakia), Irish con-
stitutional law requires a popular referendum be held prior to ratifi cation by the State of 
a treaty signifi cantly amending a treaty upon which the Union is founded; see Crotty v An 
Taoiseach [1987] IR 713 (SC). 
